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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
Henry Gibbs appeals from the district court's order 
revoking his in forma pauperis status and dismissing his 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). Gibbs contends 
that the district court erred in applying that statute, that 
the statute is an unconstitutional denial of the equal 
protection of the law, and that it denies him his 
fundamental right of access to the courts. For the reasons 
that follow, we agree that the district court erred in 
applying the statute to Gibbs and revoking his in forma 
pauperis status. Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
On February 27, 1996, Gibbs filed a civil rights complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that Dr. William C. 
Ryan, a physician at the State Correctional Institute at 
Somerset, had denied him medical treatment for a back 
injury and for injuries Gibbs allegedly sustained when he 
inadvertently ingested a piece of metal that was in his food. 
The matter was referred to a magistrate judge on that same 
day, and the magistrate judge granted Gibbs leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis. On March 6, 1996, an order was 
filed limiting Gibbs' in forma pauperis status to a waiver of 
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the prepayment of the filing fee, and noting that Gibbs may 
be responsible for other fees and expenses. The order was 
based upon Gibbs' numerous civil rights filings. There is no 
indication in the record that the Marshal's fee was ever paid 
or that defendant Ryan was ever served.1  
 
On April 26, 1996, while the instant suit was pending in 
the district court, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (April 26, 1996) which is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. S 1915 ("PLRA"). Section 804 of the 
PLRA amends the prior 28 U.S.C. S 1915 to include a new 
provision that has come to be known as the "three strikes" 
rule. That provision is as follows: 
 
       In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
       appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under 
       this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior 
       occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 
       facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the 
       United States that was dismissed on the grounds that 
       it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 
       which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 
       under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). Based upon this provision, the 
magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation 
recommending that Gibbs' previously granted in forma 
pauperis status be revoked and that he be required to 
submit the full filing fee. The district court overruled Gibbs' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note that the general practice in this Circuit is to grant leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis based solely on a showing of indigence. See 
Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, 
S 1915(c) (re-numbered as S 1915(d)) unequivocally states that "[t]he 
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all 
duties in [ifp] cases" that are not initially dismissed as frivolous by 
the 
district court. See also Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 
1992) (since district court granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis, it was district court's responsibility to serve process upon all 
defendants); Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (if 
district court does not dismiss complaint as frivolous, court is compelled 
to proceed in compliance with S 1915(c)). Since the magistrate judge 
found Gibbs eligible to proceed in forma pauperis he should not have 
imposed a prepayment requirement. On remand the district court should 
order service of the complaint without prepayment of the service fees. 
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objections to that Report and Recommendation, adopted 
the Report as the court's opinion, and dismissed Gibbs' 
complaint.2 This appeal followed. The district court granted 
Gibbs leave to appeal in forma pauperis and we appointed 
counsel to assist Gibbs with this appeal. The United States 
has intervened and filed a brief as amicus curiae limited to 
the issues raised by Gibbs' challenge to the 
constitutionality of the PLRA.3 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343. We have appellate 
jurisdiction to review a final order of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of issues of 
statutory construction and interpretation is plenary. Moody 
v. Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
II. 
 
We are thus presented with yet another issue under the 
PLRA. We must decide the narrow question of whether a 
district court may apply S 1915(g) to revoke in forma 
pauperis status that had been granted prior to enactment 
of the PLRA. We conclude it can not. 
 
Our inquiry must begin with the language of the statute. 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 
552, 557-58, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2130-31, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 
(1990); New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity 
Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1498 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(collecting cases). As set forth above, section 1915(g) 
provides that a prisoner may not "bring a civil action or 
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding[in forma 
pauperis] ...." if the prisoner has "three strikes" as specified 
in the statute (emphasis added). Despite other ambiguities 
that may exist within the text of the PLRA, Congress clearly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that the better course is to issue an order denying in forma 
pauperis status, directing payment of the fullfiling fee within a 
specified 
period and dismissing the complaint only if the litigant fails to pay the 
filing fee. 
 
3. Since we conclude that 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) doesn't apply to Gibbs, we 
do not reach the constitutional challenge. 
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limited the reach of S 1915(g) to "bringing" a civil action or 
"appealing" a judgment. Neither term is a term of art and 
we therefore assume that Congress intended those common 
words to have their ordinary meaning in the PLRA. See In 
re TMI, 67 F.3d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 
S.Ct. 1560 (1996). 
 
In the context of filing a civil action, "bring" ordinarily 
refers to the "initiation of legal proceedings in a suit." 
Black's Law Dictionary 192 (6th ed. 1990); see also 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 262 (2d 
ed. 1987) ("bring" is synonymous with "commence: to bring 
an action for damages"). Gibbs commenced his action 
against Ryan on February 27, 1996, and his request for in 
forma pauperis status was granted that same day. His 
complaint was filed, and his action was "brought" when his 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 
Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 458 
(3d Cir. 1996) (complaint "duly filed" after determination 
was made that litigant was indigent); Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 
914 F.2d 428, 430 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (when complaint is 
accompanied by motion to proceed in forma pauperis, 
rather than payment of the filing fee, complaint is not filed 
until the motion has been granted). Thus, Gibbs' complaint 
was filed almost two months prior to the effective date of 
the PLRA, and his action was brought before the"three 
strikes" provision of S 1915(g) became law. Nothing in the 
text of the statute leads us to conclude that Congress 
intended the "three strikes" provision to apply to actions 
that were "pending" as well as actions that were "brought" 
under the PLRA. See Chandler v. District of Columbia Dep't 
of Corrections, 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Canell v. 
Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1998); Garcia v. Silbert, 
141 F.3d 1415 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
In Garcia, an inmate filed a S 1983 action in the district 
court on April 9, 1996, and was granted leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis on April 18, 1996. However, after S 1915(g) 
became effective, the district court dismissed Garcia's 
claims after determining that at least three of Garcia's prior 
suits had been dismissed as frivolous as required under the 
"three strikes" provision. The court of appeals reversed 
concluding "the plain language of S 1915(g) restricts a 
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prisoner's ability to `bring a civil action or appeal a 
judgment in a civil action' in forma pauperis." Id. at 1416 
(emphasis added). The court reasoned that Garcia's claim 
had already been brought and could not subsequently be 
dismissed under S 1915(g). In Canell, both the complaint 
and the appeal were brought prior to the enactment of the 
PLRA. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that "[t]he plain language of the section indicates that it 
does not apply to pending cases on appeal, as is the case 
here." Canell, 143 F.3d at 1212, (citing Lindh v. Murphy, ___ 
U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2062, (1997)). Similarly, the court 
in Chandler examined the text of 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) and 
concluded that when "[r]ead in concert with the rest of 
section 1915," subsection (g) was intended to apply only at 
the time an indigent prisoner files a complaint or an appeal, 
and was not intended to apply later in the course of the 
proceeding. Chandler, 145 F.3d at 1358-59. 
 
This reasoning is consistent with the holding in cases 
where courts have decided whether appellate fees may be 
assessed for appeals pending on the effective date of the 
PLRA. For example, in Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 
1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996), the court held that it could not 
dismiss two remaining appeals as frivolous because 
appellant had used up his allotted "three strikes" during 
the pendency of those appeals. The court concluded that 
"[s]ection 1915(g) governs bringing new actions or filing new 
appeals--the events that trigger an obligation to pay a 
docket fee--rather than the disposition of existing cases." 
See also Thurman v. Gramley, 97 F.3d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the dispositive events for purposes of 
the new fee obligations under S 1915(b)(1) are the "bringing" 
of a civil action and the "filing" of an appeal. Once these 
"milestones" have passed, "fees do not attach to later 
activities."), Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 
1998) (application of the PLRA to prisoner's complaint 
depends on when complaint is "filed"). 
 
In Church v. Attorney General of Virginia, 125 F.3d 210 
(4th Cir. 1997), the court applied a Landgraf4 analysis and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). 
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held "the new law governing prisoner filing fees should not 
govern an action in which the prisoner has already 
`properly filed [his action and appeal] under the old 
regime.' " Id. at 213, (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 
n.29, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 n.29). 
 
However, not all courts that have addressed this issue 
have reached the conclusion we reach today. In Covino v. 
Reopel, 89 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1996), the court 
concluded that the PLRA's burdens are "slight and entirely 
avoidable," and the fee requirements of S 1915(g) can fairly 
apply to prisoners who filed notices of appeal prior to its 
enactment date, regardless of whether they had previously 
filed in forma pauperis motions or had "carryover" in forma 
pauperis status on appeal. However, we are not persuaded. 
The proper inquiry does not turn upon considerations of 
fairness. Rather, the analysis must focus on congressional 
intent. We believe that if Congress had intended the result 
reached in Covino it would not have limited the "three 
strikes" provision to an inmate's ability to "bring" an action. 
Congress could have tied the "three strikes" bar to an 
inmate's ability to maintain an action. It did not do so. 
 
We are similarly unpersuaded by the reasoning of 
Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996) and 
Strickland v. Rankin County Correctional Facility, 105 F.3d 
972 (5th Cir. 1997). Without discussion, these courts found 
S 1915(g) ambiguous as to whether it should be only 
prospectively applied. They therefore proceeded to examine 
whether applying S 1915(g) to pending complaints or 
appeals would be "retroactive" in effect -- i.e., "impair 
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's 
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect 
to transactions already completed." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 
280. Finding no such retroactive effect, the courts held that 
S 1915(g) should be applied even to complaints and appeals 
already successfully filed i.f.p. under the old rules. Because 
in our view the language of S 1915(g) is plainly prospective, 
while other PRLA provisions demonstrate Congress 
expressly required retrospective application when it so 
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desired, we believe it unnecessary to look beyond the 
statute's language to determine when it applies. 5 
 
III. 
 
For the above reasons, we will vacate the district court's 
order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion as set forth in Roman, 116 
F.3d at 86. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As an aside, we note that counsel for the United States, as intervenor, 
has taken the position that 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) should not be applied 
here since Gibbs had already been granted in forma pauperis status 
before the PLRA was enacted. See Intervenor's Br. at 12. 
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